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Abstract
I theoretically and empirically show that dismissal laws laws that impose hurdles
on ring of employees spur innovation and thereby economic growth. Theoretically,
dismissal laws make it costly for rms to arbitrarily discharge employees. This enables
rms to commit to not punish short-run failures of employees. Because innovation
is inherently risky and employment contracts are incomplete, dismissal laws enable
such commitment. Specically, absent such laws, rms cannot contractually commit
so ex-ante. The commitment provided by dismissal laws encourages employees to exert
greater e¤ort in risky, but path-breaking, projects thereby fostering rm-level inno-
vation. I provide empirical evidence supporting this thesis using the discontinuity
provided by the passage of the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notication
Act. Using the fact that this Act only applied to rms with 100 or more employees,
I undertake di¤erence-in-di¤erence and regression discontinuity tests to provide this
evidence. Building on endogenous growth theory, which posits that economic growth
stems from innovation, I also show that dismissal laws correlate positively with eco-
nomic growth. However, other forms of labor laws correlate negatively with economic
growth and swamp the positive e¤ect of dismissal laws.
JEL: F30, G31, J5, J8, K31.
Keywords: Labor laws, R&D, Technological change, Law and nance, Entrepreneur-
ship, Growth.
I would like to thank Viral Acharya and Ramin Baghai for contributing to the work in this chapter
through our earlier work on related areas.
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1 Introduction
The appropriate degree of government intervention in private contractual relationships
 particularly in employment law  remains a fraught public policy issue. In arguing
the detrimental e¤ects of laws that prevent employers from terminating labor contracts
with employees, exible labor market conditions in the U.S.  exemplied by the common-
law employment-at-will doctrine  are often contrasted to the rigidities engendered by
employment protection provisions in several European countries.
Yet, three facets of this argument deserve closer scrutiny. First, the detrimental e¤ects
of laws that limit employment-at-will often center around their ex-post consequences. For
instance, strong labor market regulation is often blamed to be one of the reasons for Europes
economic under-performance compared to the US (see a recent study by McKinsey Global
Institute, 1997). Indeed, once a situation to terminate an employment contract arises, tying
down an employers hands from doing so can lead to ex-post ine¢ cient outcomes. However,
these ex-post unfavorable e¤ects may be mitigated by the positive e¤ects that laws limiting
employment-at-will may have on ex-ante incentives. In particular, these laws might have
the countervailing e¤ect of providing rms a commitment device to not punish short-run
failures. Such commitment may spur employees to undertake risky but innovative activities
that propel the gale of creative destruction.
Second, while exible labor market conditions in the U.S. are anecdotally contrasted to
the rigidities in several European countries, in Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013), my
coauthors and I show that dismissal laws foster innovation even within European countries.
Moreover, we show that while dismissal laws foster innovation other forms of labor laws
do not. This nuance is important because laws that impose hurdles on dismissal capture
only one particular form of restriction on the employer-employee relationship. Labor laws,
however, a¤ect many other aspects of the employer-employee relationship and, therefore,
exhibit considerable variety. For example, one important category of labor laws impacts
workersability to unionize, while another one governs workersrights to engage in militant
action in the form of strikes. While dismissal laws at the country level have an ex ante positive
incentive e¤ect on innovation, other forms of labor laws do not generate such ex ante positive
incentive e¤ects on innovation. We provide this evidence by contrasting country-level changes
in dismissal laws from 1970 to 2002 in Europe with that in the United States.
Third, the image of a exible U.S. labor market does not reect substantive legal changes
in the U.S. states since the 1970s. The rapid adoption of a series of common-law doctrines
called wrongful discharge laws by most U.S. states since the 1970s represents a signi-
cant departure from employment-at-will. In Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2014), my
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coauthors and I develop a theoretical model where dismissal laws help to limit an employers
ability to hold up the innovating employee. In an incomplete contract setting, we show
theoretically that dismissal laws foster innovation by spurring innovative e¤ort by employ-
ees. Such e¤ort encourages rms to choose ex ante risky, yet value-enhancing, innovative
activities. We then exploit the natural experiment o¤ered by the passage of dismissal laws
to examine their e¤ect on innovation and entrepreneurship. Since the motivation behind
the passage of these laws were unrelated to either innovation or entrepreneurship, they o¤er
a clean empirical setting. By exploiting their staggered passage across several U.S. states,
we nd that these employment protection laws indeed appear to have an ex-ante positive
incentive e¤ect by: (i) encouraging rms and their employees to engage in more successful,
and more signicant, innovative pursuits; and (ii) stimulating the creation of new rms and
the destruction of existing ones.
In this chapter, I build on this work to examine a signicant legal change in dismissal
laws at the federal level in the U.S.  the passage of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notication (WARN) Act in 1989. Using a theoretical model and empirical analysis that
exploits a unique feature of the Act, I show that this change fostered innovation among
rms. Using other dismissal law changes at the country level, as in Acharya, Baghai and
Subramanian (2013), I then show that dismissal laws correlate positively with economic
growth. By appealing to endogenous growth theory and the careful identication of the
e¤ects on innovation, I infer that dismissal laws foster innovation and thereby economic
growth.
I develop a theoretical model to capture the higher costs imposed on rms by dismissal
laws. Dismissal laws impose direct and indirect costs on rms in dismissing their employees.
Direct costs can take the form of third party payments such as payments to courts and
lawyers in the event of litigation and to the plainti¤s in the form of damages. If the employee
sues the rm upon dismissal, dismissal laws require the rm to prove in a court of law that
the dismissal was not unjust. Therefore, in the presence of dismissal laws, rms also incur
indirect costs in collecting systematic records of the employees performance and thereby
produce veriable information about the employees e¤ort. Note that dismissal laws do not
make ring a worker impossible; rather, they require the rm to provide a valid and veriable
reason for the dismissal. The model is thus di¤erent from the one in Acharya, Baghai and
Subramanian (2014), where we focus on how wrongful discharge laws reduce hold up by
employers by enabling them to commit that they would not act in bad faith with their
employees.
I model an all-equity rm that chooses between two projects that di¤er in their degree
of innovation. Routine projects face risks mainly due to uncertainty in market demand and
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competition and have limited upside. In contrast, innovative projects result in higher termi-
nal payo¤s if successful, but entail additional risks associated with the process of exploration
and discovery. Though innovative projects may di¤er from routine projects along other
important dimensions, the di¤erence in risk is su¢ cient to generate the testable empirical
predictions.
A key friction in the model is that contracts are incomplete as in Hart (1995). Specically,
I assume that the rm cannot commit to the employee (through its ex-ante contract) that
it will not re her in those states where project failure occurs due to sheer bad luck. The
model generates the prediction that the lower threat of termination created by the passage
of such laws acts as a commitment device for the rm to not punish the employee when the
project is unsuccessful, thereby leading to an increase in the e¤ort exerted by the employee.
Furthermore, the passage of these laws disproportionately increases the investment by the
employee in the innovative project vis-à-vis the routine project. Thus, the rm too nds in-
novative projects to be more value-enhancing than routine projects. Therefore, the adoption
of dismissal laws leads to more innovation.
To investigate these hypotheses, I exploit the discontinuity introduced by the fact that the
WARN Act was applicable only to rms with 100 or more employees to undertake within-
country tests of the e¤ect of changes in dismissal laws. First, I conrm that WARN did
indeed bind by studying its e¤ects on employment. Then, I compare U.S. rms that were
a¤ected by the law change (rms with 100 or more employees) to U.S. rms that were not
(rms with less than 100 employees). I use data on patents issued by the USPTO to U.S.
and foreign rms and citations to these patents as constructed by Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg
(2001). I nd that compared to rms that were una¤ected by the passage of WARN, those
a¤ected le more patents post WARN; in addition, they le patents that are more widely
cited.
Having tested for the positive e¤ect of labor laws on innovation, I inquire what such
an e¤ect implies for country-level economic growth. While the endogenous growth theory
(see Aghion and Howitt (1992)) implies that this positive e¤ect of labor laws on innovation
should translate into a similar positive e¤ect on economic growth, other theories suggest
that stringent labor laws, which grant excessive bargaining power to organized labor, blunt
investment incentives and thereby country-level economic growth (see Stern (2001) for ex-
ample). Indeed, existing empirical evidence nds support for this inimical e¤ect of labor
laws on economic growth (see Besley and Burgess (2004)). Motivated by these conicting
predictions, I examine the e¤ect of labor law changes on growth in real value added for each
ISIC industry in a country. Consistent with the evidence in Besley and Burgess (2004), I nd
after controlling for country, industry, and year xed e¤ects, as well as other country level
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variables, that the overall e¤ect of labor laws on economic growth is negative. However,
when I disaggregate the labor laws into their sub-components, I nd that laws governing
dismissal of employees have a large, positive e¤ect on growth in real value added; the other
labor law components have either negative or insignicant e¤ects on economic growth. Using
di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit changes in dismissal laws in the US and France, I
nd further support for this positive e¤ect.
Taken together, these tests enable us to conclude that innovation is fostered by stringent
labor laws, especially by laws governing dismissal of employees and in those sectors of the
economy that are more innovation-intensive. Furthermore, while the overall e¤ect of stringent
labor laws is to dampen economic growth, laws that govern dismissal of employees are an
exception since they encourage economic growth through greater rm-level innovation.
2 Theoretical Model
To derive sharp empirical predictions, I develop a model in which a rm chooses either
of two projects; these projects di¤er only in their degree of innovation. Denote the routine
project by R while I denote the innovative project by I. To x ideas, consider a pharmaceu-
tical company deciding to invest in either of the following two projects: (1) inventing and
launching a new drug; or (2) manufacturing and launching a generic substitute for an exist-
ing drug. Launching a generic substitute involves uncertainties due to customer demand and
competition. In contrast, inventing a new drug entails additional uncertainties associated
with the process of exploration and discovery, whether such a drug could be administered to
humans, and whether it would receive FDA approval. Thus, inventing and launching a new
drug, which corresponds to the more innovative project I in the model, entails signicantly
more risk than launching a generic substitute for an existing drug, which corresponds to the
less innovative project R in the model.
Figure 2 shows the timing and sequence of events. There are three cash ow dates,
t = 0; 1; 2. At date 0, the rm invests in either of the two projects. The projects require
the same initial investment and generate cash ows at date 2: For project j; j 2 fI; Rg ; the
project cash ow is j if the project is successful and  < j if it fails. These cash ows are
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veriable.
Timing and sequence of events
After deciding on a project, at date 0:5, the rm hires an employee to work on this
project; assume the employee to be wealth-constrained. Since the project cash ows are
veriable, the rm can o¤er her a compensation or wage contract tied to these cash ows:
ewj  qSj ; qFj ; j =
(
qFj + q
S
j j if the project is successful
qFj if the project fails
(1)
Thus the employees compensation contract is characterized by qj =
 
qSj ; q
F
j

. Since the
compensation is tied to project cash ows, the employee receives it at date 2. As explained
below, the employee receives the compensation only if she is retained by the rm.
At date 1; the employee makes specialized investment ej which a¤ects the project out-
come. Assume the investment to be observable but not veriable. The employee incurs a
personal cost which is convex in the level of investment. For simplicity, assume this cost to
be
e2j
2
:
At date 1:5, i.e. before the actual cash ows accrue at date 2, a signal xj (j 2 R; I) is
obtained about these cash ows. Assume this signal to be also observable but non-veriable.
This signal xj depends upon specialized investment ej made by the agent:
xj = ej + j (2)
where  is a uniform random variable distributed over the support [0; 1] while j captures
the inherent risk of the project. Thus, the signal informs whether the project would be
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successful or not. If the signal is above (below) a threshold ; which is exogenously specied,
the project is deemed to be successful (a failure).
After observing the signal, at date 1:5, the rm decides whether to retain the employee
or to replace her. If replaced, the employee is given a severance payment by the rm, which
is normalized to zero. Denote the project cash ow generated using the new employee to
be  + ; where  is a uniformly distributed random variable over the support [0; 1]. To
model a situation where the rm nds it optimal (sub-optimal) to replace the employee after
observing a signal that indicates failure (success), assume that the cash ow generated by
the new employee is considerably greater (lower) than the cash ow upon failure (success):
 + 0:5 <  < 0:5j (3)
At date 2, project cash ows are realized and the rm pays wages to its employees. For
simplicity, assume the project outcome to be perfectly correlated with the signal obtained at
date 1:5. Therefore, the project cash ow is j if the signal is above the threshold (xj > )
while the cash ow equals  if the signal is at or below the threshold (xj  ) but the rm
retains the original employee.
Assume the labor market to be competitive with employees earning their reservation
utility in equilibrium, which is normalized to zero. Finally, the common discount rate equals
zero.
2.1 Incompleteness of contracts
A key friction in the model is that contracts are incomplete as in Hart (1995). Specically,
assume that the rm cannot commit that it will not re the employee in those states where
project failure occurs due to bad luck. This ex-ante inability to commit to not replacing the
employee ex-post stems from (i) the non-veriability of investment and, in turn, the cause
for project failure; and (ii) the rm nding it advantageous ex-post to replace the original
employee. I detail these assumptions below.
The non-veriability of the investment as well as that of the signal stems from the fact
that the contract at date 0 cannot specify in detail all the di¤erent contingencies that may
arise  a situation that Tirole (1999) labels indescribable contingencies.The assumption
of indescribable contingencies is natural to settings involving innovation (see Aghion and
Tirole, 1994, for example) because it involves considerable exploration (see Manso, 2011).
Given these unknown unknowns involved with innovation, it is unlikely that the rm
and the employee will be able to contract upon the specic details of either the employees
investment or the nature of the signal.
Formally, as seen in equation (2), project failure can be either due to bad luck or due to
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the employees incompetence, i.e., a low level of investment by her. However, since investment
is assumed to be non-veriable, the rm cannot commit through a state-contingent contract
with the employee at date 0 that it will not re the employee in those states of the world
where failure resulted due to bad luck.
2.2 Innovative vs. Routine Project
Routine projects face risks mainly due to uncertainty in market demand and competi-
tion. In contrast, innovative projects entail additional risks associated with the process of
exploration and discovery. Therefore, in the model, the key di¤erence between these projects
is that the innovative project is riskier than the routine one:
I > R (4)
The innovative project also generates greater cash ows if it is successful. For simplicity,
assume that each project, if successful, generates a return that is proportional to its risk:
I
I
=
R
R
= k (5)
Assume that the routine project possesses a minimum threshold level of risk:
R >  (6)
2.3 Risk Preferences
While the rm is assumed to be risk-neutral, the employee is averse to the risk of being
red. To ensure tractability, the employees utility is modeled in the following simple manner:
U = E [ ew]| {z }
Utility from expected wage
    prob (fired)  qF| {z }
Dis-utility from being red
(7)
Thus, as usual, the employee derives utility from his wage income (the rst term above).
However, if red, she experiences a dis-utility in the form of a penaltyequal to the xed
wage qF : This dis-utility increases with (i) her degree of risk-aversion, which I denote by 
( > 0) ; and (ii) the probability of her getting red.1
1Gilson (1981) provides empirical evidence that when managers are red from under-performing publicly
listed companies, they do not nd employment in another publicly listed company for three years on average.
We are attributing a similar dis-utility to the rms employees.
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2.4 Dismissal Laws
As in MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007), I model the passage of Dismissal Lawsas an
increase in the costs incurred in ring a worker. Employment protection regulation can
impose direct and indirect costs on rms with respect to dismissing employees. Direct costs
can take the form of third party payments such as payments to courts and lawyers in the
event of litigation and to the plainti¤s in the form of damages.2 If the employee sues the rm
upon dismissal, dismissal laws require the rm to prove in a court of law that the dismissal
was not unjust. Therefore, in the presence of Dismissal Laws, rms also incur indirect costs
to acquire veriable information about the employees e¤ort. Note that dismissal laws do
not make ring a worker impossible; rather, they require the rm to provide a valid and
veriable reason for the dismissal. If the rm collects systematic records of the employees
performance, it can prove to a court of law that the employee performed at an unacceptable
level. In this case, dismissal of the employee is justied. Thus, the evidentiary requirements
of the legal system necessitate the rm to invest in verifying the employees performance and
obtain a better evaluation of the same.
I model this e¤ect of dismissal laws in a reduced form. After the passage of these laws,
the rm has to incur a positive xed cost  when dismissing an employee. In contrast, under
employment-at-will, there are no costs incurred in dismissing an employee. Thus, given
  0; the employment-at-will regime is nested as a special case. To ensure that dismissal
laws do not make dismissals impossible in equilibrium, assume:
 <

+ 1
+     (8)
2.5 Analysis
The model is solved by backward induction. Consider the rms decision at date 1:5
whether or not to replace the original employee. First, consider the case where the signal
indicates that the project will be a success. Since the value generated under the new employee
 is assumed to be lower than the cash ow conditional on success j (see (3)), the rm nds
it optimal to retain the employee in this case.
Next, consider the case where the signal indicates that the project will fail. In this
case, the value generated under the original employee is  while that generated under the
2As evidence of such costs incurred by employers, Dertouzos et al. (1988) nd in a study of California
court awards between 1980 and 1986 relating to wrongful discharge cases that plainti¤s were on average
awarded $650,000 (the median was lower at $177,000). A signicant fraction (40%) of these awards were for
punitive tort damages. Such awards were not exclusive to California either (Edelman et al., 1992; Abraham
1998).
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replacement employee is given by  +    : Therefore, the rm replaces the employee if
 +    > ; i.e. if  >     + . Thus, the probability of retaining the original employee,
which I denote by ; equals:
 = max (    + ; 0) (9)
Since  = 0 under employment-at-will and  >  using (3) it follows that  = 0 in this case.
Thus, under employment-at-will, the rm nds it optimal to replace the employee when the
signal indicates project failure. Also, using (8) ; it follows that     +  < 1: Therefore,
dismissal laws do not make dismissals impossible.
Lemma 1 If the signal indicates project success, the rm always retains the original
employee. If the signal indicates project failure, the rm replaces the original employee with
probability min (1 +       ; 1).
Therefore, at date 1:5, there are three outcomes that are possible: (1) the signal indicates
that the project will be successful; (2) the signal indicates that the project will fail but the
rm does not re the employee; and (3) the signal indicates that the project will fail and
the rm res the employee. The probability of these outcomes, the original employees wage
and her dis-utility are given in the following table:
Outcome: Success Failure but employee retained Failure & employee replaced
Probability: 1   ej
j

 ej
j



 ej
j

(1  )
Wage: qFj + q
S
j j q
F
j 0
Dis-utility: 0 0  qF
Given project j, let the employees and rms expected payo¤s at date 0 be Uj and Vj
respectively and the aggregate payo¤beWj = Uj+Vj. The employees payo¤ is the expected
value of her wage minus the dis-utility from being red as given by (7) : The rms payo¤
is given by its expected cash ows, where the cash ow in a particular state equals the
aggregate cash ow less the wage paid to the employee less any costs incurred in dismissing
the employee. Also, when the rm replaces the original employee, the cash ow under the
new employee equals  + : The resulting expressions for Uj and Vj are given in Appendix
A in equations (A  1) and (A  2).
Then, given the project and the optimal compensation contract, the employee chooses
investment ej (qj) to maximize Uj: The expression for this investment is given in Appendix A
in equation (A  6) : Using the expression for the investment chosen by the employee, I derive
the rm value Vj: For given project j, the rmowners maximize Vj when choosing the optimal
compensation contract qj . Intuitively, the rm faces the following trade-o¤ in deciding the
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optimal contract: While increasing the employees xed or variable compensation decreases
the rms payo¤, increasing compensation incentivizes the employee to exert greater e¤ort.
This trade-o¤ is formalized in Appendix A in equations (A-8).
Finally, since the labor market is competitive, employees earn their reservation wage in
equilibrium. Therefore, the rm-owners choose between innovative and routine project at
date 0 to maximize the joint payo¤Wj. Lemma 2 formalizes this result.
Lemma 2 The optimal project is chosen to maximize the aggregate payo¤ to the rm and
the employee.
2.6 Results
Given these steps for solving the model, I now derive the key results and discuss their
testable empirical implications. The proofs for these results are provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 If the employee is not risk-averse ( = 0), then the rm chooses not to pay
her a xed wage (part (a)). Under employment-at-will ( = 0) if the employee is risk-averse
( > 0), the rm pays the employee the entire cash ow in the case of failure as her xed
wage (part (b)). Under dismissal laws ( > 0) ; if the employee is risk-averse ( > 0), then
the rm pays her a xed wage that is less than the cash ow in case of failure (part (c)).
(a)  = 0) qFj = 0 (10)
(b)  = 0;  > 0) qFj =  (11)
(c)  > 0;  > 0) 0 < qFj <  (12)
If the employee is not averse to the risk of being red, the rm nds it optimal to
incentivize her by providing a variable payo¤when the project succeeds. Therefore, the rm
decides to set the xed portion of the employees compensation to be zero. In contrast, if
the employee is risk-averse but the rm cannot commit to not re the employee (because
dismissal laws do not exist), the rm chooses to pay her the maximum xed wage (which
equals the entire cash ow in the event of project failure) to motivate the employees e¤ort.
Dismissal laws enable the rm to commit to not re the employee in some states of the world.
Therefore, the rm does not need to pay her the maximum xed wage in this case.
Thus, interior solutions for both qFj and q
S
j are obtained only if dismissal laws exist and the
employee is risk-averse. In this case, the optimal compensation contract (qSj ; q
F
j ) is given
in equations (A-13) and (A-14) in Appendix A. In turn, the optimal level of investment ej
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given this optimal compensation contract is specied by:
ej =   

1  
 (1  )

j (13)
The employees equilibrium level of investment exhibits the following features. First,
the investment in the innovative project is lower than that in the routine project. Second,
an increase in the stringency of dismissal laws increases the employees investment. Third,
an increase in the stringency of these laws disproportionately increases the investment in
the innovative project when compared to the increase in investment in the routine project.
Finally, an increase in the employees risk aversion decreases her investment.
Proposition 2 If dismissal laws exist ( > 0) and the employee is risk-averse ( > 0), the
employee chooses lower e¤ort with the innovative project than with the routine project (part
(a)). However, an increase in the stringency of dismissal laws disproportionately increases
the investment by the employee in the case of the innovative project relative to the increase
in the investment in the routine project (part (b)):
(a) eI < e

R (14)
(b)
deI
d
>
deR
d
(15)
The intuition for these results is as follows. Recall that the rm cannot commit to not
ring the employee in those states of the world where failure occurs due to bad luck. Since
the e¤ect of investment on project success is lower with the innovative project than with
the routine project (the probability of success decreases with j), failure due to bad luck is
more likely with the innovative project than with the routine project. Therefore, the rms
inability to commit to not ring in these states leads to the employee exerting lower e¤ort
with the innovative project.
Given the inherent riskiness of innovative projects, the insurance e¤ect of dismissal laws
stemming from a lower threat of termination matters more for the innovative project than
for the routine project. This insurance e¤ect leads the employee to increase his investment
relatively more with the innovative project than with the routine project.
Thus, the greater risk involved in the innovative project always generates an ine¢ ciency
in the form of reduced investment by the risk-averse employee. However, reducing the threat
of termination induces the employee to invest more in the innovative project and thus reduces
the ine¢ ciency in investment. In other words, dismissal laws act as a commitment device
for the rm and thereby lead to a greater increase in the employees investment.
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Proposition 3 Given a risk-averse employee ( > 0) and some restrictions on the level of
her risk-aversion ( < ), an increase in the stringency of dismissal laws increases the value
of the innovative project disproportionately more than the value of the routine project.
dW I
d
>
dW R
d
(16)
The intuition for this result follows directly from part (b) of Proposition 2. Since an
increase in the employees investment increases the likelihood of project success, a dispro-
portionate increase in the employees investment in the innovative project (relative to the
routine project) leads to a similar increase in the value of the project. This explains the dis-
proportionate increase in the value of the innovative project when compared to the routine
project resulting from the adoption of more stringent dismissal laws.
This result generates the empirical prediction that the passage of dismissal laws in a state
would lead rms located in that state to prefer investing in innovation. Furthermore, since
the increase in value from innovation becomes disproportionately greater, this e¤ect of the
passage of dismissal laws would manifest more in the innovation-intensive industries than in
the brick-and-mortarindustries.
Note that our model does not help answer whether the passage of wrongful discharge
laws increases or decreases the value of the routine project. This is because we do not
model the possibility that the employee might shirk in the presence of laws that reduce the
threat of termination. Manso (2009) considers such an exploitstrategy in addition to the
innovative explorestrategy, and shows that an increased threat of terminating the agents
employment upon failure prevents the agent from shirking, even though such an increased
threat also dissuades the agent from exploring the new work method. Incorporating the
possiblility of shirking into our setup would deliver the additional result that the value from
the routine project would decrease due to the passage of wrongful discharge laws.
Proposition 4 Given a risk-averse employee ( > 0) and some restrictions on the level of
her risk-aversion ( < ), there exists a b 2 (0; 1) such that the value from the innovative
project is higher than the value from the routine project when dismissal laws are not stringent
  b and the reverse is true when such laws are stringent  > b
  b ) W I () > W R () (17)
 > b ) W I ()  W R () (18)
This result follows directly from the Proposition 3. Since the threat of dismissal is
relatively higher when dismissal laws are less stringent, the ine¢ ciency in an employees
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investment is disproportionately greater for the innovative project under such a regime, which
explains the fact that innovation is less attractive when dismissal laws are less stringent.
Thus, the e¤ect of dismissal laws in enabling commitment by the rm translates into a
positive e¤ect on rm value as well.
The propositions from the model directly lead to the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Passage of dismissal laws leads to greater innovation.
Hypothesis 2 : Passage of dismissal laws leads to a larger increase in employee e¤ort in
the innovative projects when compared to the routine projects.
3 E¤ect of dismissal laws on innovation
I present tests of the main hypothesis using within-country variation in dismissal law
changes in the U.S. These tests exploit a discontinuity introduced by the passage of the
federal U.S. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notication (WARN) Act. These tests
complement the settings used in Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013, 2014). A key
advantage of these tests is that they remove any concerns about country-level unobserved
factors driving the results.
3.1 An Overview of the WARN Act
The WARN Act is a federal law (P.L. 100-379) that was enacted by the U.S. Congress
on August 4, 1988, and became e¤ective on February 4, 1989.3 The WARN Act requires
employers to give written notice 60 days before the date of a mass layo¤ or plant closing to
a¤ected workers, to the local governments chief elected o¢ cial where the employment site
is located and to the State Rapid Response Dislocated Worker Unit. Subject to the law are
private employers with 100 or more full-time employees, or with 100 or more employees who
work at least a combined 4,000 hours a week. Only layo¤s classied as mass layo¤s or
plant closings,or layo¤s of 500 or more full-time workers at a single site of employment,
are covered.4 In the case of non-compliance, employees, their representatives, and units of
local government can bring individual or class action suits in federal district courts against
employers. Employers who violate the WARN Act are liable for damages in the form of back
pay and benets to a¤ected employees.
3The details on the WARN Act reported in this section are drawn from the following two sources,
unless otherwise noted: United States Department of Labor  Employment & Training Administration
(http : ==www:doleta:gov=layoff=warn:cfm); and Levine (2007).
4A plant closingis dened as a closure of a facility within a single site of employment involving layo¤s
of at least 50 full-time workers. In the case of a mass layo¤,an employer lays o¤ either between 50 and
499 full-time workers at a single site of employment, or 33% of the number of full-time workers at a single
site of employment. For further details about the WARN Act, see Levine (2007).
14
The requirement of prior notication to local government together with penalties for non-
compliance imply that the WARN passage increases the hurdles faced by employers when
dismissing employees. This e¤ect is in line with the e¤ect of dismissal laws as discussed
in the theoretical motivation. Therefore, I expect WARN to have the predicted e¤ect on
innovation.
Before examining the e¤ect of WARN on innovation, a key question that arises is whether
the WARN Act indeed binds for innovative rms. I provide evidence that the WARN Act
applies to U.S. rms irrespective of their industry, and that its passage had a signicant
impact on rm employment. To show the diversity of companies a¤ected by the WARN Act,
I examine the WARN Act notices received by the Employment Development Department in
California in 2009. These included the following companies5: AT&T company; Circuit City
Stores, Inc.; Comcast Cable; San Francisco Chronicle; Sun Microsystems, Inc.; The Boeing
Company; Walt Disney World Co.; Virgin Mobile USA; NEC Electronics America, Inc.;
American Airlines, Inc.; Siemens; The McGraw-Hill Companies; FOX Interactive Media,
Inc.; Henkel Corporation; Hilton Hotels Corporation; HSBC; National Semiconductor Cor-
poration; Palm, Inc.; SAP America, Inc.; Seagate Technology LLC; Symantec; Yahoo! Inc.;
JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Valeant Pharmaceuticals International; Adobe Systems Incorpo-
rated; Stanford University; Genentech, Inc.; and many others. Clearly, this list encompasses
a broad range of rms, and also those that are known for their strength as innovators.
The range of rms issuing WARN Act notices illustrates that the threat of dismissal is
a very clear and present danger for researchers. The following passage from a January 2009
Wall Street Journal article6 is meant to emphasize this point further: Pzer Inc. is laying
o¤ as many as 800 researchers in a tacit admission that its laboratories have failed to live
up to the tens of billions of dollars it has poured into them in recent years. [...] While the
new cuts will only dent Pzers overall work force of 83,400, they strike at the companys
lifeblood: the labs charged with discovering lucrative new drugs.
3.2 Do employment protection laws a¤ect white-collar employees?
A commonly prevailing perception is that employment protection laws, such as the
WARN Act, matter to rms only with respect to their relationships with blue-collar work-
ers. However, such acts are quite relevant to a rm with respect to its relationship with
professional/ white-collar employees as well. I provide case-based evidence to highlight this
fact.
The leading case involving employment protection in the case of a scientist who followed
5Source: http : ==www:edd:ca:gov=Jobs_and_Training=warn=eddwarnlwia09:pdf
6Corporate News: Pzer Plans Layo¤s in Research Drug Maker Has Little in Pipeline to Show for Its
$7.5 Billion R&D Budget,The Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2009.
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ethical principles of his profession is Mehlman v. Mobil Oil (707 A.2d 1000; N.J. 1998).
Dr. Mehlman was an internationally respected toxicologist who was employed by Mobil Oil.
When Dr. Mehlman learned that Mobil was selling gasoline in Japan that contained more
than 5% benzene,7 Dr. Mehlman insisted that Mobil immediately stop this harmful practice.
Mobil decided to terminate Mehlmans employment one month after he objected to the high
benzene concentrations. In the ensuing trial, the jury ruled that Mobil had violated the
public policy exception and awarded Dr. Mehlman US$ 3,440,300 in compensatory damages
and US$ 3,500,000 in punitive damages.
Another famous case involves Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp. (823 P.2d 100; Colo.
1992). Paul M. Lorenz was a mechanical engineer, who specialized in fracture mechanics
of metals. Martin Marietta Corporation, which was a supplier of external tanks to NASAs
space shuttles, wrongfully terminated Lorenzs employment allegedly in violation of the
public policy exception. Lorenz expressed his concern that the testing sequence proposed
was inadequatefor an external tank for NASAs space shuttle. Lorenz was ordered by his
supervisor to make modications to the minutes of a meeting that had been prepared by
Lorenz, which he refused to do. Lorenz complained about the design and construction of a
test xture, in which Martin Marietta spent only 40% of the funds appropriated by NASA.
He was pressured by his superiors to attest to the adequacy of certain materials.... His
refusal was based on his professional opinion that the materials had not been subjected to 
adequate testing.The Colorado Supreme Court a¢  rmed an appellate court ruling in favor 
of the plainti¤, citing the employers violation of the federal fraud statute (18 USC § 1001) 
as the relevant violation in this case of employment.
3.3 Data
To construct proxies for innovation, I use data on patents led with the U.S. Patent O¢  ce 
(USPTO) and the citations to these patents, compiled in the NBER Patents File (Hall, Ja¤e 
and Trajtenberg, 2001). Patents have long been used as an indicator of innovative activity 
in both micro- and macro-economic studies (Griliches, 1990). Although patents provide an 
imperfect measure of innovation, there is no other widely accepted method which can be 
applied to capture technological advances. Nevertheless, using patents has its drawbacks. 
Not all rms patent their innovations, because some inventions do not meet the patentability 
criteria and because the inventor might rely on secrecy or other means to protect its inno-
vation. In addition, patents measure only successful innovations. To that extent, the results 
are subject to the same criticisms as previous studies that use patents to measure 
innovation
7Compared to the gasoline that is sold in the United States, which must contain less than 1% benzene, the 
5% benzene content in Japan was excessive. 
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(e.g., Griliches, 1990; Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
The NBER patent dataset provides among other items: annual information on patent
assignee names, the number of patents, the number of citations received by each patent, the
technology class of the patent and the year that the patent application is led. I match the
NBER patents le to the Compustat data. Each assignee in the NBER dataset is given a
unique and time-invariant identier. I match the U.S. assignee names in the NBER patent
dataset to the names of divisions and subsidiaries belonging to a corporate family from
the Directory of Corporate A¢ liations. I then match the name of the corporate parent to
Compustat, which I use to obtain rm-level accounting data.
I date the patents according to the year in which they were applied for. This avoids
anomalies that may be created due to the lag between the date of application and the date
of granting of the patent (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Note that although I use the
application year as the relevant year for the analysis, the patents appear in the database only
after they are granted. Hence, I use the patents actually granted (rather than the patent
applications) for the analysis.
3.4 Proxies for Innovation
I use four di¤erent proxies for innovation. The rst proxy is a simple count of the number
of patents that were led in a particular year in a specic patent class. As the second metric
of innovative activity, I use the cumulative citations received by a rms patents in a specic
year. Citations capture the importance and drastic nature of innovation. This proxy is moti-
vated by the recognition that the simple count of patents does not distinguish breakthrough
innovations from less signicant or incremental technological discoveries.8 Intuitively, the
rationale behind using patent citations to identify important innovations is that if rms are
willing to further invest in a project that is building upon a previous patent, it implies that
the cited patent is inuential and economically signicant. In addition, patent citations tend
to arrive over time, suggesting that the importance of a patent may be revealed over a period
of time and may be di¢ cult to evaluate at the time the innovation occurs. These two proxies
enable me to test Hypothesis 1.
As the third and fourth proxies for innovation, I employ the number of patents per
employee as well as the number of citations per employee. These proxies enable me to
capture employee e¤ort in innovation and thereby test Hypothesis 2.
8Pakes and Shankerman (1984) show that the distribution of the importance of patents is extremely
skewed, i.e., most of the value is concentrated in a small number of patents. Hall et al. (2005) among others
demonstrate that patent citations are a good measure of the value of innovations.
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3.5 Test Design
I exploit the passage of the U.S. WARN Act as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate
the impact of the strengthening of dismissal laws on innovation by U.S. rms. The key to
implementing this test is that only employers with more than 100 employees are a¤ected
by the law (the treatment group), while rms with less than 100 employees are not (the
control group). Figure 1 shows the linear t of the number of patents and citations across
time for the treated (rms with 100 or more employees) and control (rms with less than
100 employees) before and after 1989. The presence of a break for the treated rms and the
absence of the same for the control group of rms in 1989 is quite clear from this gure.
Tests formalizing this visual e¤ect enable us to shut out any unobserved heterogeneity that
may a¤ect multiple-country examinations.
I measure the e¤ect of the strengthening of dismissal laws via WARN on the treatment
rms vis-à-vis the control rms using the following specication:
yit = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987  After1988t + X + it (19)
where y is a proxy for innovation by rm i in year t, After1988t is a dummy taking the value
of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. for the years 1989-1994), and Over100i;1987 is
a dummy taking the value of one if a rm has  100 employees in 1987 and zero otherwise.9
Using the rm size in 1987 a year before the passage of the WARN Act enables me to
account for possible endogeneity in the rm size with respect to the WARN Act. i and t
are rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively. X is a set of control variables. Since After1988t
and Over100i;1987 vary based on the year and the rm respectively, the year xed e¤ects
and the rm xed e¤ects respectively subsume their individual e¤ects. The sample covers
twelve years around the passage of the WARN Act (from 1983-1994). I cluster all standard
errors at the rm level. 1 measures the di¤erence-in-di¤erence e¤ect on innovation of the
strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN Act.
In addition to controlling for the time-invariant heterogeneity of rms via rm dummies
and for general macro-economic factors via year dummies, I also control for rm size to
account for the possibility that larger rms might innovate more on average. Furthermore,
9The number of employees obtained from Compustat (data item emp) is the number of all employees of
consolidated subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign; this also includes U.S. employees working at a foreign
facility of a U.S. employer, who do count towards the 100 employee threshold. However, foreign workers at
foreign sites of U.S. rms do not count towards the threshold, but are included in the number of employees
obtained from Compustat. We might therefore include some companies within the treatment group sample
even though they are not a¤ected by the WARN Act. However, this is of limited concern in our tests since
we only consider patents led by inventors who are not only working for U.S. rms, but also residing in the
U.S.
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I include Tobins Q to control for investment opportunities, as these might also have an
impact on a rms innovation policies. Finally, as Sapra et al. (2009) show that innovation
is fostered by either an unhindered market for corporate control or strong anti-takeover laws
that signicantly deter takeovers, I employ a control for the external takeover pressure a rm
faces.
I approximate Tobins Q via the Market-to-Book ratio, which is the market value of
assets to total book assets. Market value of assets is total assets (Compustat data item
at) plus market value of equity minus book value of equity. The market value of equity
is calculated as common shares outstanding (csho) times scal-year closing price (prccf).
Book value of equity is dened as common equity (ceq) plus balance sheet deferred taxes
(txdb). Size is the natural logarithm of sales (sale). Anti-Takeover Index is the state-level
index of anti-takeover statutes from Bebchuk and Cohen (2003). The ve anti-takeover
statutes considered are Control Share acquisition, Fair-price, Business Combination, Poison
Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies statutes. The resulting index is a simple count of the
number of state anti-takeover statutes in place in a given state and year, and ranges from 0
to 5. In order to eliminate the impact of outliers, I winsorize the variables Market-to-Book
and Size at 1% and 99%. Table 1 describes the summary statistics for the main variables
used in the tests.
3.6 Impact ofWARNAct on Employment: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence
tests
I rst examine whether the WARN Act was binding for rms by investigating the e¤ect
of its passage on employment uctuations.
Table 2 documents the impact of the passage of the WARN Act on employment uctua-
tions. I run regressions as described in equation (19), but with the year-to-year employment
change of rm i between year t and t  1 (Empt;t 1), as well as between year t + 1 and t
(Empt+1;t), as dependent variables. Thus, the coe¢ cient 1 captures the e¤ect of increased
employment protection through the passage of the WARN Act on annual net employment
ows. As can be seen from columns 1-4 of Table 2, the WARN Act had a negative and, in
most specications, signicant impact on employment uctuations.
In order to ascertain that the WARN Act had an e¤ect on innovative as well as less-
innovative rms, I split the sample into two parts. First, I dene innovation intensity,
similar to the cross-country setup, as the median number of patents applied for by rms in
industry j in year (t 1). As I am using the Compustat-matched sample in the WARN tests,
the industry classication here is based on two-digit SIC codes. I then perform separate tests
for rm-years with innovation intensity below or equal to the median intensity for a given
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year. Table 3 shows the results of these tests. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of tests
for rm-years with innovation intensity below the median intensity for a given year while
columns 3 and 4 show the same for rm-years with innovation intensity above the median
intensity. As can be seen from the results, the WARN Act reduced employment uctuations
in both high and low patenting intensity rms alike.
3.7 Impact of WARN Act on Innovation: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence
tests
I now investigate the impact on innovation by carrying out di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
using the number of employees in a rm in 1987 to categorize them into the control and
treatment groups. Table 4 shows the results from the di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests focussing
on the impact of WARN on rm level innovation. Columns 12 implement equation 19
without control variables, while columns 34 include the control variables described above.
In line with Hypothesis 1, I nd that the strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN
Act had a positive and signicant impact on U.S. rm-level innovation. To be specic, in
column 3 of Table 4 (specication with control variables) I estimate that the passage of
the WARN Act increases innovation as measured by patents by exp(0.217)-1=24% in the
treatment group (rms with  100 employees) vis-à-vis the control group (rms with < 100
employees). The e¤ect is of similar magnitude when innovation is measured by the number
of citations (29%). These results are thus consistent with Hypothesis 1.
3.8 Impact of WARN Act on Innovative E¤ort: Di¤erence-in-
di¤erence tests
As I discussed in Section 2.6, the positive e¤ect of stringent dismissal laws on innova-
tion results due to the positive e¤ect that stringent dismissal laws have on employee e¤ort
(Hypothesis 2). Therefore, I investigate whether the passage of WARN had an e¤ect on
employee e¤ort in innovative projects. For this purpose, I normalize the proxies for aggre-
gate level of innovation using the number of employees in a rm. Table 5 report the results
using ln(patents=employees) and ln(citations=employees) as the dependent variables. Sim-
ilar to the strong results obtained using the aggregate measures of innovation, here I nd
that both patents and citations per 1000 employees increase signicantly post the passage
of WARN. Thus, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 is consistent with WARN resulting in (i) an
increase in employee e¤ort in innovative projects; and (ii) an increase in aggregate measures
of innovation.
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3.9 Regression-Discontinuity Tests
To fully exploit the discontinuity due to the WARN Act and thereby provide the cleanest
evidence of the hypotheses, I focus on rms in the range [90,110]. Since the number of rms
in the [99,101] range is quite limited, we employ the expanded window [90,110]. Figure 2,
which shows the before-after di¤erence in the number of patents following the WARN Act
as a function of the number of rm employees in 1987, depicts this discontinuous e¤ect very
clearly. To ascertain that results are not spurious, as placebo tests, I also test for any e¤ects
on innovation by using cuto¤s of 50 and 150 employees and a sample of rms with employees
in the range [40, 60] and [140, 160] respectively. I proceed by rst showing that WARN
indeed had a dampening e¤ect on employee dismissals in a¤ected rms. I then estimate the
e¤ect of WARN on innovation.
3.9.1 Test design: WARN Act and employee layo¤s
To test whether the WARN Act indeed imposed a binding constraint for innovative rms,
I dene employee layo¤s to have occurred in rm i in year t if the number of employees in that
year is lower than that in the previous year. I then estimate the following linear probability
model for the twelve years surrounding the passage of the WARN Act (1983-1994):
Ind(Empi;t < Empi;t 1) = t+1 Over100i;1987 After1988t+2 Over100i;1987+ it (20)
where Ind(Empi;t < Empi;t 1) is a binary variable taking on a value of one in case of a
net employment reduction in rm i from year t   1 to year t. The other variables are as
dened in equation (19). Since employee layo¤s due to the WARN Act do not exhibit much
within-rm variation, I do not include rm-xed e¤ects in this specication. However, to
control for average di¤erences in employee layo¤s across years, I include the year xed e¤ects
t.
Column 1 in Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of the tests of equation (20) for rms
having employees in the range [90,110] in 1987. I nd that the passage of WARN decreased
the likelihood of layo¤s in the a¤ected rms. Compared to the control set of rms in the
range [90,99], the before-after di¤erence in the likelihood of employee layo¤s decreased by
25% for the treated rms in the range [100,110]. Columns 2-5 in Panel A of Table 6 show the
results for the e¤ect of WARN on innovation. First, in Columns 2-3 of Panel A, I report the
results of tests for the proxies of aggregate innovation using the log of the number of patents
and citations respectively as the dependent variables. In line with Hypothesis 1, I nd that
the strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN Act had a positive and signicant impact
on U.S. rm-level innovation.
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I test Hypothesis 2 in Columns 4-5 of Panel A by using ln(patents/ employees) and
ln(citations/ employees) as the dependent variables. Here as well, I nd that both patents
and citations per employee increase after the passage of WARN for the treatmentgroup of
rms; however, the increase is only statistically signicant for the citations-based measure.
Panels B and C of Table 6 show the results for the placebo tests using only rms with
employment in the range [40, 60] and [140, 160] respectively in 1987. In each of these panels,
Column 1 shows the e¤ect on employee layo¤s, while Columns 2-3 show the results for the log
of the number of patents and citations, respectively. Finally, Columns 4-5 report the results
using log of the number of patents and citations per employee respectively. In both these
panels, I can infer that there was no di¤erential e¤ect at the corresponding placebo cuto¤s.
This provides reassurance that the positive e¤ect of WARN on innovation documented in
Panel A is not spurious.
3.9.2 Robustness Tests for the E¤ect of the WARN Act on Innovation
I present additional robustness tests for the e¤ect of the WARN Act on innovation in
Table 7. In these tests, I examine the piecewise linear e¤ect of the passage of the WARN Act
on innovation across rms with di¤erent numbers of employees. I employ the whole sample
of rms in these tests. In Columns 1 and 2, I conrm what I observed in Figure 2: consistent
with the 100 employee threshold imposed by the WARN Act, I nd that the positive break
in innovation occurs for rms with more than 100 employees when compared to rms with
fewer than 100 employees. These tests also further underscore that the e¤ect occurs at the
level of hundred employees and not below.
Inference from a regression-discontinuity design can be invalid if the assignment variable
 in the setting the number of employees per rm  can be precisely manipulated. One
could argue that to avail themselves of the positive innovation incentive e¤ects that the
credible commitment to a more stable employment policy in the form of stronger dismissal
laws brings, rms may choose their employment gures so as to fall within the scope of
application of WARN. However, inference is valid as long as there is not exact manipulation.
As Lee and Lemieux (2010, p.283) point out: If individuals  even while having some
inuence  are unable to precisely manipulate the assignment variable, a consequence of
this is that the variation in treatment near the threshold is randomized as though from a
randomized experiment.I argue that this is the case in the tests for three reasons. First,
employers cannot unilaterally decide on the number of employees - employees are free to
quit anytime, and there are well-documented search frictions in the labor market which can
prevent employers from going on a hiring spree. Second, I use the employee count in 1987,
one year before the passage of WARN, to classify rms into treatment and control group,
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which reduces the possibility of such manipulation driving the results. To the extent that
some of the rms that I classify as control rms increase employment so as to fall under
WARN and then innovate more, this actually biases against nding the hypothesized result.
Finally, it is likely that rms below 100 employees would switch to the treatment group
after WARN only if it helps them to create greater incentives for innovation. Thus, if it
were the case that such endogenous switching from control to treatment group is accounting
for the results, in Columns 3 & 4 of Table 7, I would observe the greatest and lowest
magnitudes respectively in the (100  Emp < 105)i;1987 and (125  Emp)i;1987 ranges with
the coe¢ cient for the (105  Emp < 125)i;1987 range between these two extremes. This is
because the e¤ect of endogenous switching is likely to be largest in the [100; 105) group and
be lowest in the  125 group. However, in Columns 3-4 I do not nd such di¤erences in the
coe¢ cients. In fact, I nd that the F-test for the equality of the coe¢ cients corresponding
to each range cannot be rejected at the 95% level. In sum, I am able to alleviate concerns
that the results are driven by the endogenous switching of rms from control to treatment
groups or vice-versa.
3.10 Benets of Tests Using the WARN Act
The above tests based on WARN o¤er several advantages. First, since the sample for the
WARN tests ended in 1994, they enable us to conclude that the results on the positive e¤ect
of dismissal laws on innovation are not driven by any spurious e¤ects that patent reforms
motivated by the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) may have had.10
Second, the tests based on the WARN Act mitigate e¤ects of any other contemporaneous
factors that may confound the results. This strength of the WARN based tests stems from a
combination of three factors. First and foremost, since the rms are separated into treatment
and control groups based on the number of employees, any unobserved factor that a¤ects
all rms uniformly (i.e. irrespective of employment gures) cannot be driving the results.
Nevertheless, as a second line of defense, I have used rm-xed e¤ects to account for time-
invariant e¤ects of unobserved factors, in general, and rm size, in particular. Second, I
have performed regression-discontinuity tests to focus on rms just above and below the
employment cut-o¤ relevant for WARN.
Third, in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests, I have included rm size to account for any
time-varying correlation of any unobserved factors with rm size. Therefore, laws or policy
10Under the GATT changes, an unexpired issued patent or a patent application pending on June 8, 1995,
has a term of protection that is the longer of 17 years from the date of issuance of the patent or 20 years
from the ling date of the patent application. For applications led on or after June 8, 1995, the patent
life is now twenty years, measured from the earliest patent application. However, since our sample for the
WARN tests ended in 1994, our results are not driven by GATT related changes.
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changes or any other unobserved factors that may inuence innovation cannot a¤ect the
results unless they resemble WARN in discriminating based on the size of the workforce.
Fourth, related to the above, the WARN tests also alleviate concerns that the results
may be a¤ected by the coinciding of the post WARN period with the recession in the early
1990s. To the extent that this recession slowed down the average pace of innovation, the
application year xed e¤ects should capture this e¤ect.
Fifth, since rms of similar sizes should have felt the e¤ect of the recession similarly, the
regression-discontinuity specication provides conrmation that the results are not a¤ected
by the recession in the 1990s.
Finally, the WARNAct was not intended to specically encourage innovation or economic
growth.11 Therefore, the tests above can reasonably be interpreted as a truly causal e¤ect
of the WARN Act passage on innovation.
4 E¤ect of Dismissal Laws on Economic Growth
The endogenous growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt (1992)) posits that rm level
innovation accounts for economic growth at the country level. Given their positive e¤ect on
innovation, do dismissal laws have a similar positive e¤ect on economic growth? Moreover,
does the e¤ect of other forms of labor laws on economic growth resemble that of dismissal
laws?
To investigate this question, I use the labor law index developed by Deakin et al. (2007),
which is employed in Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013). I refer the reader to
Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013) for a detailed description of the index. I can-
not use the WARN Act for this investigation for two reasons. Firstly, the WARN Act was a
law change at the federal level and therefore, economic growth cannot be contrasted within
the U.S. Second, the WARN Act only a¤ected the laws pertaining to dismissal and not other
forms of labor laws. Therefore, WARN does not allow me to investigate if the e¤ect of other
forms of labor laws on economic growth resembles that of dismissal laws.
Using the Deakin et al. (2007) index, I examine how changes in labor laws a¤ect industry
level growth rates in real value added. I start with a log-linear specication for the e¤ect in
levels of labor laws on real-value added:
lnYict = it+ ct+ t + 1  LaborLawsc;t + X + ict (21)
where Yict denotes the real value added in ISIC industry i in country c in year t. t de-
11Brügemann (2007) examines various articles in the business press that document the events preceding
and following the WARN Act. He does not nd any evidence arguing that the Act was aimed at improving
a specic aspect of the U.S. economy.
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notes year xed e¤ects while it and ct denote a time-trending, industry-specic and time-
trending, country-specic e¤ects that allow for time-varying country-level and industry-level
factors to a¤ect output in a given industry in a given country. To alleviate endogeneity
concerns in the above estimation, I employ the rst-di¤erence transformation on (21) and
obtain the following specication:
yict = i + c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict (22)
where yict = ln YictYic;t 1 denotes the continuously compounded growth in real value added
in ISIC industry i in country c in year t, and t = t   t 1; "ict = ict   ic;t 1: The
dependent variable here is similar to that employed in Rajan and Zingales (1998) (they
use the annualized growth rate rather than the continuously compounded one). 1 here
measures the impact of changes in labor laws on the growth in real value added. The
country xed e¤ects c and i control for country- and industry-specic unobserved factors
a¤ecting growth in real value added while the year-xed e¤ects control for inter-temporal
di¤erences in growth in real value added. Given these xed e¤ects, the assumption required
to identify 1 is that time-varying unobserved determinants of growth in real value added
at the country and industry levels are uncorrelated with the labor law index.
I obtain data on nominal value added from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database.
I use CPI data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to deate the value added data in
order to obtain real values; as CPI data for India is not available from the aforementioned
source, I obtain the CPI data for that country from the International Labour Organizations
Labour Statistics database. the sample extends from 1970-2003.
I display the results of this test in Table 8. In all regressions, I include country and year
xed e¤ects; standard errors are clustered at the industry (ISIC class) level to account for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Several interesting features emerge. Most impor-
tantly, as can be seen from Panel A, columns 1 and 2, the overall impact of stringent labor
laws on growth is signicantly negative. Moreover, the impact of strong creditor rights on
growth is also signicantly negative, which is consistent with the ndings in Acharya and
Subramanian (2009). In the regressions in columns 1 and 2, I control for the logarithm of the
level of imports and the level of exports that a given country has with the US in each year at
each 3-digit ISIC industry level, in order to account for the e¤ect of bilateral trade; further-
more, in column 2, I also control for industry level comparative advantage by including the
ratio of value added in a 3-digit ISIC industry in a particular year to the total value added
by that country in that year. Finally, in column 2, I also include the logarithm of real GDP
per capita in order to control for a countrys economic development. In terms of economic
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magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimates in column 1 and 2 indicate that an increase in the
aggregate labor index by one would, ceteris paribus, result in a 2.5% decrease in output.12
Splitting the Deakin et al. (2007) labor index into its ve sub-components allows us to
paint a more nuanced picture of the impact of labor laws on growth. As can be seen from
column 3 in Panel A, more stringent regulation of dismissal laws has a large positive and
signicant e¤ect on industry level growth rates; the impact of the other labor law components
on growth is insignicant. Quantitatively, the impact of regulation of dismissal on output /
growth is substantial: The coe¢ cient of 0.3 indicates that an increase in the dismissal index
by one, implying a strengthening of dismissal laws, would, ceteris paribus, result in a 7.5%
increase in output.
4.0.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests using single country changes
To make further progress on the causal e¤ects of laws governing dismissal on economic
growth, I examine the e¤ects of large dismissal law changes on industry level growth rates
using di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit single country changes.
The results can be seen in Table 9. The rst test examines the impact of dismissal law
changes in France in the early 1970s; the control group is the US. Results are reported
in column 1 of Table 9. In the second natural experiment, where I exploit dismissal law
changes in the US in 1989, the control groupis Germany, which did not experience such
a law change in the sample period. Results are presented in column 2 of Table 9. The
results from the two natural experiments indicate that the e¤ect of stringent dismissal laws
on growth is indeed positive and signicant.
In sum, after controlling for country, industry, and year xed e¤ects, as well as other
country level variables, I nd a negative e¤ect of aggregate labor laws on economic growth.
When I disaggregate the labor laws into their sub-components, I nd that stringent regulation
of dismissal laws has a large positive and signicant e¤ect on industry level growth rates;
the impact of the other labor law components on growth is either negative or insignicant.
Finally, using dismissal law changes in the US, UK, and France, I document that the impact
of stringent dismissal laws on industry growth is similarly positive and signicant.
5 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature that examines the e¤ect of laws that govern
the relationships between employees and their employers. Botero et al. (2004) nd that
12The coe¢ cient on the aggregate labor index is approximately -0.1, which means that a 10% increase in
the index will result in a 1% decrease in output. Similarly, a 25% increase in the index, which implies a one
unit change in the aggregate labor index (which takes on values between 0 and 4), would result in a 2.5%
decrease in output.
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heavier regulation of labor leads to adverse consequences for labor market participation and
unemployment and conclude that government interventions in the labor market are driven
primarily by political economic considerations and not by any reasons of e¢ ciency. Atanassov
and Kim (2007) examine the interaction between labor laws and investor protection laws and
nd that rigid employment laws lead to higher likelihood of value-reducing major asset sales,
particularly when investor protection is weak. They nd that assets are sold to forestall
layo¤s, even if these asset sales hurt performance. Besley and Burgess (2004) conclude from
their study of manufacturing performance in Indian states that pro-worker labor laws are
associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, and output. Bassanini, Nunziata
and Venn (2009) also conclude that mandatory dismissal regulations have a depressing e¤ect
on productivity growth in industries where layo¤ restrictions are more likely to be binding,
based on data for OECD countries from 1982 to 2003.
In contrast to these studies which document the negative e¤ects of labor laws, this study
nds that stringent dismissal laws spur employees to exert innovative e¤ort and thereby
encourage innovation and economic growth. The study complements the work of Acharya,
Baghai and Subramanian (2013, 2014) by focussing on a federal law change in the U.S. and
examining concomitant e¤ects on economic growth. As explained in the introduction, the
model developed in this study di¤ers from that in Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2014).
While the model in that study focuses on the e¤ect of wrongful discharge laws in enabling
rms to commit to their employees ex-ante that they would not act in bad faith ex-post,
the model in this study focuses on the costs that dismissal laws impose on rms when they
tried to re their employees. Also, this study di¤ers from that in Acharya, Baghai and
Subramanian (2013) by focusing on innovation at the rm level rather than at the industry
(i.e. patent class) level.
In other related studies, Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) focus on a specic aspect
of labor laws  the extent to which unions are allowed to operate  and survey the existing
literature for their e¤ects on innovation. They note that while U.S. studies nd a negative
impact of unions on innovation, European studies do not support these ndings. the study
pools together ve representative countries that span three di¤erent legal origins and
account for over 70% of patents led in the U.S. While Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen
(2003) focus on laws governing unions, I examine all dimensions of labor laws and pay
particular attention to laws governing dismissal of employees.
Also related to the study is the work by MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007). They present
a model which builds on the literature of relationship specic investment in order to capture
the e¤ect that employment law has on the incentives of the rm to select and monitor workers
carefully. Using current population survey data from 19831994, they investigate the impact
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of the adoption of so-called Dismissal Lawsby U.S. state courts on employment. In most
states these dismissal laws take the form of non-statutory common law exceptions from the
employment-at-will doctrine which began to be recognized by many U.S. state courts from
the 1970s onwards. Macleod and Nakavachara (2007) present evidence that these dismissal
laws enhance employment in industries requiring high relationship specic-investment and
reduce employment in low relationship-specic investment sectors.
6 Policy Implications for Asian Economies
This study provides important implications for the Asian economies. These implications
generally stem from the fact that most Asian economies, except for Japan, lag behind the
leading innovators such as United States and Germany. It is quite pertinent in this context
that Japan, with its policies of life-time employment that economically capture stringent dis-
missal laws in their essence, remains the most innovative among Asian economies (Mariguchi
and Ono, 2004; Ono, 2010). As our theoretical model posits, innovative projects are inher-
ently risky. So, the insurance e¤ect that stringent dismissal laws or life-time employment
policies provide leads employees to increase their investment disproportionately more, when
compared to employment at will, in the innovative project than in the routine project.
Therefore, country-level policies that discriminate between brick-and-mortar sectors and the
innovative sectors in the nature of employment protection can be extremely useful in fos-
tering incentives for innovation. Thus, our study suggests that countries intending to foster
innovation may benet from focussing on innovation promotion zones,where the labor
regulation is adapted such that dismissal of employees is di¢ cult. These zones would con-
trast to the export promotion zones,where the labor regulation is minimal to encourage
manufacturing exports. Such seggregation is important to distinguish the innovative sectors
of the economy from the brick-and-mortar sectors, where labor regulation should be minimal
to reduce the ine¢ ciencies that are created from stringent dismissal laws.
Policymakers must be careful to not interpret our study as advocating stringent dismissal
laws for all sectors of the economy. As we have shown theoretically, the incentive for employ-
ees to invest more when dismissal laws are stringent manifests primarily in the innovative
sectors. The ine¢ ciencies created by labor regulation can only get exacerbated by uniformly
making dismissal more stringent across all sectors.
7 Conclusion
In this study, I presented empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the ease with which employees can be dismissed by rms and their innovation; such
innovation also seems to correlate with country-level economic growth.
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To aid identication, the e¤ect on innovation of the dismissal law I examined might
have been purely an unintended consequence of these laws. However, the robustness and
strength of the results begs the question whether such laws might in fact be necessary to
promote innovation. Can rm-level contracts not su¢ ce to provide employees the incentives
to innovate? One possibility is that innovation may have externalities and thus institutions
supporting innovation might be desirable to get socially e¢ cient investments in innovation
(Romer, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Another pos-
sibility is that rm-level contracts lack the force of commitment that laws o¤er. Since the
outcomes of innovation are unpredictable, they are di¢ cult to contract ex ante (Aghion and
Tirole, 1994), which renders private contracts to motivate innovation susceptible to rene-
gotiation. Such possibility of renegotiating contracts dilutes their ex-ante incentive e¤ects.
Since laws are considerably more di¢ cult for private parties to renegotiate than rm-level
contracts, legal protection of employees in the form of stringent dismissal laws can introduce
the time-consistency in rm behavior absent with only private contracts.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Steps for deriving the expressions for employees expected payo¤ Uj and rms expected
payo¤ Vj:
Uj =

1     ej
j

  qFj + qSj j| {z }
Project is successful
+

   ej
j

  qFj| {z }
Project fails but rm does not re employee
     ej
j
(1  )  qFj| {z }
Employees dis-utility
  e
2
j
2|{z}
Cost of e¤ort
(A-1)
Vj =

1     ej
j

  1  qSj j   qFj | {z }
Project is successful
+

   ej
j

      qFj | {z }
Project fails but rm does not re employee
+

   ej
j
 1Z

( +    ) d
| {z }
Project fails and rm replaces original employee
(A-2)
where  denotes the probability of retaining the original employee. Note that the last term
in Vj captures the fact that the original employee is replaced only if  >  (using Lemma 1)
and cash ows under the new employee equals +   : Also, note that Uj incorporates the
fact that the employee gets no wage if she is red.
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Proof of Lemma 2: The optimal project choice is given by
max
j
Vj
 
ej ; q

j

(A-3)
s:t: Uj
 
ej ; q

j
  0
ej (qj) = arg max
ej
Uj (ej; qj)
qj = arg max
qj
Vj

qj
 
ej

where the employees reservation utility in equilibrium equals 0. Since the labor market
is competitive, the IR constraint is satised with equality. Therefore, Uj = 0: Since Vj =
Wj   Uj, the above problem reduces to
max
(q;j)
Wj
 
ej ; q

j

(A-4)
ej (qj) = arg max
ej
Uj (ej; qj)
qj = arg max
qj
Vj

qj
 
ej

}
Steps for deriving the expressions for qFj ; q
S
j and e

j when  > 0 and  > 0: Simplifying
equation (A  1) I get
Uj = q
F
j + q
S
j j  

   ej
j

qFj (1  ) (1 + ) + qSj j
  e2j
2
(A-5)
Given project j and the compensation contract
 
qSj ; q
F
j

; the choice of investment ej ; which
maximizes Uj, is given by the unique solution:
ej (qj) =

qSj j + q
F
j (1  ) (1 + )

j
(A-6)
Simplifying equation (A  2) I get
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Di¤erentiating w.r.t. qSj and q
F
j and setting the derivatives equal to zero, I get
dV j
dqSj
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(A-9)
where for notational simplicity, I dene
Qj =
 
1  qSj

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Also, using equation (A  6) I get
dej
dqSj
=
j
j
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(A-11)
Finally, using equation (A  8) and (A  11) I get
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j
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Since  =     +  < 
+1
using (8) ; it follows that the equilibrium probabilities of project
success and failure are non-negative. Substituting equation (A  12) together with equation
(A  6) and solving I get
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}
Proof of Proposition 1 : Part (a): Using equation (A  8) and (A  11) with  = 0; it is
easy to show that 1
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zero simultaneously. Therefore, both qSj and q
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equations (A  5) and (A  7), I get
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so that
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When qSj = 1;
dW j (=0)
dqSj
< 0: Therefore, the total surplus can be improved by decreasing
qSj : Furthermore, since q
S
j = 1 implies that the rm does not get any of the cash ow when
the project is successful, the rm nds it individually rational as well to choose qSj < 1:
Therefore,
dV j (=0)
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Parts (b) and (c): Using (9) ; it follows that  = 0 )  = 0 and  > 0 )  > 0: Using
equation (A  8) with  = 0; I get
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Since  > 0; it implies that both
dV j (=0)
dqFj
and
dV j (=0)
dqSj
can equal zero only if the probability
of success in equilibrium, which equals

1   ej
j

; is zero always. Since the rm would like
to choose the compensation contracts such that the probability of success is positive, both
qSj and q
F
j cannot have interior solutions. Now, using equations (A  5) and (A  7) with
 = 0 I get
Wj ( = 0) =

1     ej
j

j +

   ej
j

 + 0:5 (1 + )  qFj
  e2j
2
(A-18)
so that
dWj ( = 0)
dqSj
=
" 
1  qSj

j   qFj      0:5
j
#
j
j
Thus, dWj(=0)
dqSj
< 0 if qSj = 1: Therefore, the total surplus can be improved by decreasing
qSj from q
S
j = 1: Furthermore, since q
S
j = 1 implies that the rm does not get any of the
cash ow when the project is successful, this implies that the rm would choose qSj < 1:
Similarly, since j > 2 >  +  + 0:5 >  + qFj + 0:5 using (3), it follows that
dWj
dqSj
> 0
if qSj = 0: Therefore, the total surplus can be improved by increasing q
S
j from q
S
j = 0 (to
increase the employees e¤ort). Therefore, qSj > 0: It follows that q
S
j has an interior solution.
Using
dV j (qSj )
dqSj
= 0 together with equation (A  6) and solving I get:
qSj ( = 0) =
 + k
2k
  j
2k
   (2 + ) +  + 0:5
2kj
(A-19)
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From equation (A  17) ; it follows using dV

j (qSj )
dqSj
= 0 that
dV j
dqFj
> 0; which implies that
qFj has the boundary solution q
F
j = : As I have shown above (see Steps for deriving the
expressions for qFj ; q
S
j and e

j when  > 0 and  > 0) q
S
j and q
F
j have interior solutions
when  > 0 and  > 0. Therefore qFj <  when  > 0 and  > 0:}
Proof of Proposition 2 : Using equation (A  12) I get
dej
dj
=  

1  
 (1  )

< 0 using (8) ) I > R ) eI < eR (A-20)
d2ej
djd
=
1
 (1  )2 > 0 ) I > R )
d (eI   eR)
d
> 0 (A-21)
}
Proof of Proposition 3 : Using equations (A  5) and (A  7) together with equation (5) ; I
get
W j =
kj
 (1  ) +

1  
 (1  )

 + (1  ) + 0:5 (1 + )  qFj 	   ej22 (A-22)
Di¤erentiating w.r.t. j and simplifying I get
dW j
dj
= j + k   4j
 (1  ) +
3j
2
2 (1  )2 (A-23)
Now di¤erentiating w.r.t.  I get
d2W j
ddj
=
2j
 (1  )2

3
 (1  )   2

Dene  = 2(1 )
3
: Then  <  )  < 2(1 )
3
) d2W j
ddj
=
d2W j
ddj
> 0: Since  increases
monotonically with , it follows that dW

R
d
<
dW I
d
.}
Proof of Proposition 4 : Dene  = 3k: Then using equation (A  23) I get dW j
dj

= 2
2+3
=
k  j
3
< 0 since j >  according to (6) : Now using (A  23) again, I get dW

j
dj

= 
+1
= k > 0:
Since
d2W j
ddj
> 0 (as proved in Proposition 3) and 2
2+3
< 
+1
; it follows that
dW j
dj
has a single
crossing in the range  2
h
2
2+3
; 
+1
i
: The result therefore follows using the fact that  varies
positively with .}
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Y-axis: Residual of logarithm of patents or citations
Impact of WARN on innovation by U.S. firms
Figure 1: E¤ect of passage of WARN Act on innovation in U.S.
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Figure 2: Discontinuous e¤ect based on employee size of WARN Act on innovation
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
The table gives summary statistics for the following variables: number of patents, number of
employees, rm size, and the rms market-to-book ratio. Patent data is from the NBER Patents
File (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001).
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation
Number of patents 12822 17.1 2 61
Number of citations 12822 173.7 24 706.8
Number of employees 9397 16147.2 2552 45634.6
Firm size - Sales ($millions) 10900 2630.8 309.3 8452.4
Market-to-book ratio 10900 2.1 1.3 4.3
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Table 2:
Impact of WARN Act on US rm-level employment Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
Empt;t 1 = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987  After1988t + X + it
where Empt;t 1 is the year-to-year employment change of rm i between year t and t  1
(Empt+1;t is the corresponding employment change between year t + 1 and t), and i
and t are rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively. The sample covers twelve years around
the passage of the WARN Act (from 1983-1994). After1988t is a dummy taking the value
of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the years 1989-1994). Over100i;1987 is a
dummy taking the value of one if a rm has  100 employees in 1987, and zero otherwise.
1 measures the di¤erence-in-di¤erence e¤ect on innovation of the strengthening of dismissal
laws via the WARN Act. X is a set of control variables. Market-to-Book ratio is the market
value of assets to total book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Anti-Takeover
Index is the state-level index of anti-takeover statutes from Bebchuk and Cohen (2003).
Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level
data is from Compustat. Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is Empt;t 1 Empt+1;t Empt;t 1 Empt+1;t
Over100i;1987  After1988t -0.328** -0.543*** -0.234 -0.765***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19)
Size 0.930*** -0.395***
(0.20) (0.14)
Market-to-Book 0.139*** 0.140***
(0.042) (0.040)
Anti-Takeover Index -0.004 0.135
(0.096) (0.17)
Constant -0.063 0.611*** -5.772*** 1.013
(0.22) (0.18) (1.24) (0.70)
Observations 9,025 9,397 7,968 8,142
R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.17
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y
Application year dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table 3: Impact of WARN Act on US rm-level employ-
ment for innovative and non-innovative industries Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
Empt;t 1 = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987 After1988t + X + it
where Empt;t 1 is the year-to-year employment change of rm i between year t and t   1 (Empt+1;t
is the corresponding employment change between year t + 1 and t), and i and t are rm and year xed
e¤ects, respectively. The sample covers twelve years around the passage of the WARN Act (from 1983-
1994). After1988t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the years
1989-1994). Over100i;1987 is a dummy taking the value of one if a rm has  100 employees in 1987, and
zero otherwise. 1 measures the di¤erence-in-di¤erence e¤ect on innovation of the strengthening of dismissal
laws via the WARN Act. X is a set of control variables. Market-to-Book ratio is the market value of assets
to total book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Anti-Takeover Index is the state-level index of
anti-takeover statutes from Bebchuk and Cohen (2003). Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall,
Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level data is from Compustat.
In columns 14, we split the sample into two parts according to innovation intensity. We dene innovation
intensity in industry j as the median number of patents applied for by rms in two-digit SIC industry j in
year (t   1). Columns 1 & 2 present the results from tests for rm-years with innovation intensity below
or equal to the median intensity for a given year, while columns 3 & 4 show the results for rm-years with
innovation intensity above the median intensity for a given year.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Innovation Low Innovation High Innovation High Innovation
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
Dependent variable is Empt;t 1 Empt+1;t Empt;t 1 Empt+1;t
Over100i;1987 After1988t -0.221 -0.550*** -0.982* -1.742***
(0.27) (0.19) (0.57) (0.60)
Size 0.973*** -0.227 0.988** -1.052***
(0.25) (0.15) (0.39) (0.35)
Market-to-Book 0.123** 0.145*** 0.187** 0.215**
(0.053) (0.051) (0.073) (0.087)
Anti-Takeover Index -0.037 0.088 0.007 0.281
(0.11) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24)
Constant -4.251*** 0.828 -6.432** 4.218
(1.05) (0.67) (2.77) (2.67)
Observations 5,510 5,609 2,458 2,517
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.18 0.16
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y
Application year dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table 4:
Impact of WARN Act on US rm-level innovation Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987 After1988t + 2 Over100i;1987 + 3 After1988t + X + it
where y is a proxy for rm-level and time-varying innovation (the natural logarithm of patents or citations,
as well as the natural log of patents and citations per 1,000 employees), and i and t are rm and year
xed e¤ects, respectively. The sample covers twelve years around the passage of the WARN Act (from
1983-1994). After1988t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the
years 1989-1994); this coe¢ cient is subsumed by the year dummies. Over100i;1987 is a dummy taking the
value of one if a rm has  100 employees in a given year, and zero otherwise. 1 measures the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence e¤ect on innovation of the strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN Act. X is a set of
control variables. Market-to-Book ratio is the market value of assets to total book assets. Size is the natural
logarithm of sales. Anti-Takeover Index is the state-level index of anti-takeover statutes from Bebchuk and
Cohen (2003). Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level
data is from Compustat.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Patents Citations Patents Citations
Natural Logarithm of
Over100i;1987 After1988t 0.144** 0.281*** 0.217*** 0.252**
(0.059) (0.088) (0.069) (0.10)
Over100i;1987 0.124** -0.084 -0.196*** -0.234**
(0.051) (0.093) (0.067) (0.11)
Size 0.275*** 0.221***
(0.030) (0.041)
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.016
(0.009) (0.013)
Anti-Takeover Index -0.044*** -0.033
(0.015) (0.021)
Constant 1.094*** 3.551*** 0.071 2.591***
(0.050) (0.088) (0.17) (0.19)
Observations 12,822 12,545 10,900 10,684
R-squared 0.86 0.80 0.87 0.80
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y
Application year dummies Y Y Y Y
41
Table 5:
Impact of WARN Act on US rm-level innovation Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987 After1988t + 2 Over100i;1987 + 3 After1988t + X + it
where y is a proxy for rm-level and time-varying innovation (the natural logarithm of patents or citations,
as well as the natural log of patents and citations per 1,000 employees), and i and t are rm and year
xed e¤ects, respectively. The sample covers twelve years around the passage of the WARN Act (from
1983-1994). After1988t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the
years 1989-1994); this coe¢ cient is subsumed by the year dummies. Over100i;1987 is a dummy taking the
value of one if a rm has  100 employees in a given year, and zero otherwise. 1 measures the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence e¤ect on innovation of the strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN Act. X is a set of
control variables. Market-to-Book ratio is the market value of assets to total book assets. Size is the natural
logarithm of sales. Anti-Takeover Index is the state-level index of anti-takeover statutes from Bebchuk and
Cohen (2003). Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level
data is from Compustat.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Patents per Citations per Patents per Citations per
Natural Logarithm of 1,000 employees 1,000 employees 1,000 employees 1,000 employees
Over100i;1987 After1988t 0.207*** 0.355*** 0.138** 0.177*
(0.070) (0.096) (0.069) (0.10)
Over100i;1987 -0.893*** -1.100*** -0.525*** -0.545***
(0.076) (0.11) (0.073) (0.11)
Size -0.324*** -0.383***
(0.029) (0.039)
Market-to-Book -0.001 0.016
(0.009) (0.013)
Anti-Takeover Index -0.038** -0.028
(0.016) (0.021)
Constant 1.399*** 3.870*** 3.105*** 4.959***
(0.071) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23)
Observations 12,821 12,544 10,899 10,683
R-squared 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.85
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y
Application year dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table 6: Impact of WARN
Act on US rm-level Employment and innovation Regression discontinuity tests.
The regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1 Over100i;1987 After1988t + Xit + it
i and t are rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively. Across all three panels, the dependent variables
are (the log of) patents and citations, as well as (the log of) patents and citations scaled by the number
of employees. In addition, we also employ as dependent variable Ind(Empi;t   Empi;t 1 < 0), a binary
variable taking on a value of one in case of a net employment reduction in rm i from year t  1 to year t.
Over100i;1987 is a dummy variable taking the value of one in each year if a given rm has  100 employees
in 1987, and zero otherwise. After1988t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage of the WARN
Act (i.e. the years 1989-1994. The sample period is 19831994. Robust standard errors (clustered at the
rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable is Ind(Empi;t Ln(Patents) Ln(Citations) Ln(Patents / Ln(Citations /
< Empi;t 1) Employees) Employees)
Panel A: 90  Employmenti;1987 < 110
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Over100i;1987 After1988t -0.293** 0.370** 0.606*** 0.599 0.724*
(0.114) (0.146) (0.217) (0.444) (0.432)
Over100i;1987 0.283***
(0.083)
Observations 435 916 916 765 765
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.828 0.693 0.649 0.681
Panel B: 40  Employmenti;1987 < 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Over50i;1987 After1988t -0.076 0.176 0.633 -0.468* 0.191
(0.209) (0.152) (0.598) (0.254) (0.476)
Over50i;1987 -0.030
(0.147)
Observations 115 259 259 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.039 0.188 0.348 0.633 0.492
Panel C: 140  Employmenti;1987 < 160
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Over150i;1987 After1988t 0.104 -0.115 0.201 -0.164 0.033
(0.159) (0.357) (0.451) (0.592) (0.717)
Over150i;1987 -0.124
(0.181)
Observations 88 170 170 155 155
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.490 0.633 0.447 0.516
Firm FE N Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 7: Impact of WARN
Act on US rm-level innovation Robustness of regression discontinuity results
The regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1  (X  Emp < Y )i;1987 After1988t + Xit + it
i and t are rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively. The dependent variables are (the log of) patents and
citations. (X  Emp < Y )i;1987 is a dummy variable taking the value of one in each year if a given rm has
between X and Y employees in 1987, and zero otherwise; as, for a given rm, this variable does not vary
over time, its e¤ect is subsumed in the rm dummies. After1988t is a dummy taking the value of one after
the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the years 1989-1994); this coe¢ cient is subsumed by the year dummies.
Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level data is from
Compustat. The sample period is 19831994. Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is LN of Patents Citations Patents Citations
(60  Emp < 80)i;1987 After1988t -0.212* -0.208
(0.118) (0.230)
(80  Emp < 100)i;1987 After1988t -0.154* -0.137
(0.090) (0.161)
(100  Emp < 120)i;1987 After1988t 0.179** 0.402**
(0.086) (0.184)
(120  Emp)i;1987 After1988t 0.076 0.364***
(0.048) (0.121)
(100  Emp < 105)i;1987 After1988t 0.230 0.441**
(0.150) (0.193)
(105  Emp < 125)i;1987 After1988t 0.255*** 0.437**
(0.092) (0.196)
(125  Emp)i;1987 After1988t 0.166*** 0.448***
(0.047) (0.082)
Observations 13,067 13,067 13,067 13,067
Adjusted R-squared 0.851 0.736 0.851 0.736
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE Y Y Y Y
44
Table 8: E¤ect of Labor Laws on Industry Level Growth.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of real value added in ISIC industry i in country c in year t.  is the
rst di¤erence operator. i; c; t denote ISIC class, country, and year xed e¤ects. 1 measures the impact
of labor laws on output/growth. The sample period is 19702003. F.D.denotes that the rst di¤erence
of a variable was employed in the regression. Data on nominal value added are obtained from the UNIDO
Industrial Statistics database. CPI data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics was used to deate the value
added data in order to obtain real values; as CPI data for India was not available from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the CPI data for that country was obtained from the International Labour Organizations
Labour Statistics database. The labor law index data is from Deakin et al. (2007). The Creditor Rights
Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Log Imports is the log of a countrys imports from the
US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log of a countrys exports to the US in
a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year (export and import data are from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006).
Ratio of Value Added is the ratio of value added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the total value added by
that country in that year (from UNIDO). Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable is First Di¤erence in ln(Real ln(Real ln(Real
Value Added) Value Added) Value Added)
Labor Index (F.D.) -0.096* -0.101**
(0.041) (0.032)
Creditor Rights Index (F.D.) -0.076*** -0.080***
(0.013) (0.007)
Log Imports (F.D.) -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Log Exports (F.D.) 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000)
Ratio of Value Added (F.D.) 6.575***
(1.63)
Log of per capita GDP (F.D.) 1.449***
(0.28)
Regulation of dismissal (F.D.) 0.299***
(0.056)
Regulation of working time (F.D.) -0.120
(0.14)
Alternative employment contracts (F.D.) -0.149
(0.086)
Employee representation (F.D.) -0.117
(0.15)
Industrial action (F.D.) 0.353
(0.32)
Constant -0.069** -0.114*** 0.066
(0.022) (0.029) (0.051)
Country, Year, and ISIC class dummies Y Y Y
Observations 751 751 1446
R-squared 0.38 0.71 0.28
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Table 9: E¤ect of Labor Laws on Industry Level Growth: Two-country Tests.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of real value added in ISIC industry i in country c in year t.  is the
rst di¤erence operator. i; c; t denote ISIC class, country, and year xed e¤ects. 1 measures the impact
of labor laws on output/growth. The sample period is 19702003. F.D.denotes that the rst di¤erence
of a variable was employed in the regression. Data on nominal value added are obtained from the UNIDO
Industrial Statistics database. CPI data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics was used to deate the value
added data in order to obtain real values; as CPI data for India was not available from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the CPI data for that country was obtained from the International Labour Organizations
Labour Statistics database. The labor law index data is from Deakin et al. (2007). The Creditor Rights
Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Log Imports is the log of a countrys imports from the
US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log of a countrys exports to the US in
a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year (export and import data are from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006).
Ratio of Value Added is the ratio of value added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the total value added by
that country in that year (from UNIDO). Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
France & US;France dismissal Germany & US; US dismissal
law change in early 1970s; law change in 1989;
data from 1970-1988 data from 1970-1995
Dependent Variable is First Di¤erence in ln(Real ln(Real
Value Added) Value Added)
Regulation of dismissal (F.D.) 0.640*** 0.328*
(0.074) (0.15)
Constant 0.077*** 0.105***
(0.015) (0.014)
Country, Year, and ISIC class dummies Y Y
Observations 330 434
R-squared 0.35 0.31
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